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DOWN WITH THE SHIP: THE 
PROSECUTION OF PIRATICAL ACTS IN 
UNITED STATES v. ALI 
LINDSAY R. GROSSMAN* 
Abstract: Following the November 2008 pirate attack on the Danish merchant 
ship CEC Future, interpreter and negotiator Ali Mohamed Ali was arrested and 
charged in the United States with four inchoate offenses related to his actions 
aboard the ship: conspiracy to commit piracy on the high seas, aiding and abet-
ting piracy on the high seas, conspiracy to commit hostage taking, and aiding and 
abetting hostage taking. Using the Charming Betsy canon, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit held that the charge of aiding and abetting piracy was 
improperly dismissed because Ali’s actions did not have to be committed on the 
high seas. Using the same analysis, the court reached the opposite conclusion for 
the conspiracy to commit piracy charge—holding that it was properly dismissed 
by the district court. Addressing the hostage taking charges, the court rejected 
Ali’s due process argument, reversing the lower court, and held that he could 
have reasonably anticipated being haled into court. Though the future utility of 
this ruling is unclear, the court’s focus on the interplay between domestic and in-
ternational law provides important modern precedent as the international com-
munity fights to end piracy across the globe. 
INTRODUCTION 
Though the international seafaring community has been plagued by acts of 
piracy on the high seas for centuries, the frequency of piratical acts has increased 
dramatically in the last few decades.1 One such act involved the ransom of 
crewmembers on the Danish merchant ship CEC Future by a band of Somali 
pirates whose interpreter and negotiator, Ali Mohamed Ali, was later arrested in 
the United States.2 Ali was charged with conspiracy to commit piracy on the 
high seas, aiding and abetting piracy on the high seas, conspiracy to commit hos-
tage taking, and aiding and abetting hostage taking.3 In United States v. Ali, the 
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 1 Michael Reisman & Bradley T. Tennis, Combating Piracy in East Africa, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 
ONLINE 14, 15 (2009), 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5943&context=fss_papers 
[https://perma.cc/FT8M-5AVU]. 
 2 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 932–33 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 3 Id. at 933–34. 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the decision of the District 
Court in part and reversed in part, holding that the charge of conspiracy to com-
mit piracy was properly dismissed, but that the remaining three charges were 
legally sufficient and should not have been limited or dismissed.4 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of piracy in the Horn of 
Africa, as well as the factual and procedural history of United States v. Ali. Part 
II provides a discussion of the reasoning utilized by the court to determine which 
of the government’s allegations were legally sufficient. Part II also explores the 
court’s holding regarding the proper dismissal of the charge of conspiracy to 
commit piracy and the due process arguments employed by Ali and accepted by 
the lower court. Part III argues that the court correctly dismissed the charge of 
conspiracy to commit piracy, but that the future effect of the decision in the 
United States is unknown due to national and international efforts to curb Somali 
piracy through alternative means. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Piracy in East Africa 
Piracy off the Somali coast has come to public attention in recent years fol-
lowing the well-known pirate attack on the Maersk Alabama—the inspiration for 
and true story behind the 2013 film Captain Phillips—which featured a five-day 
standoff between U.S. Navy SEALs and a gang of Somali pirates who had cap-
tured the 17,000-ton cargo ship off the Horn of Africa.5 The frequency of acts of 
piracy such as this has grown most dramatically off the coast of East Africa, 
where there were 222 incidents in 2009 alone—a sharp increase from the 134 
attacks in 2008 and 60 in 2007.6 These types of attacks are particularly lucrative 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. at 932. 
 5 See Tricia Escobedo, Controversy Surrounds New Tom Hanks Movie, ‘Captain Phillips,’ CNN 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/08/showbiz/captain-phillips-movie-controversy/ [https://
perma.cc/4EUX-PX9L]; Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shane, In Rescue of Captain, Navy Kills 3 
Pirates, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/world/africa/13pirates.html 
[https://perma.cc/9FHS-9T4H]. The Horn of Africa is the easternmost region of the African continent 
and is home to numerous countries, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Horn of Africa, 
ENCYC. BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/place/Horn-of-Africa [https://perma.cc/
6TXM-B6Q2] (last updated July 3, 2015). Some definitions also encompass portions of Kenya, Su-
dan, South Sudan, and Uganda. Id. The Horn of Africa region is also referred to as the Somali penin-
sula. Id. 
 6 INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: 
ANNUAL REPORT—2009, at 2 (2010), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/Documents/PiracyReports/152-Annual2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HVX4-QC3M]. Of the 222 incidents that took place in 2009, 204 took place in in-
ternational waters, only fifteen took place in territorial waters, and three took place in a port area. Id. 
at annex 2, 3. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS: ANNUAL REPORT—2008, at 1 (2009), http://www.imo.org/
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in the Gulf of Aden, a natural sea link between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, 
situated between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, and bounded by 
the Somali coast to the South and the Yemeni coast to the North.7 Pirates have 
increasingly exploited the high maritime traffic in the area, as well as the lack of 
deterrence from a weak Somali government, by hijacking large commercial 
ships and ransoming the crews for exorbitant sums of money.8 
B. Attack on the CEC Future 
Mere months before the famous capture and subsequent rescue of Captain 
Phillips, the Danish merchant ship CEC Future was overtaken on the high seas 
as it traveled through the Gulf of Aden carrying cargo owned by a U.S. corpora-
tion.9 On November 7, 2008, a band of Somali pirates boarded the CEC Future 
armed with AK-47s and a rocket-propelled grenade, seized the crew, and rerout-
ed the ship toward Eyl, an infamous Somali pirate port.10 Two days later, on No-
vember 9, interpreter and negotiator Ali Mohamed Ali boarded the ship off the 
coast of Somalia at Point Raas Binna.11 With the exception of a matter of 
minutes, the ship traversed only territorial waters while Ali was on board.12 
Upon boarding the ship, Ali immediately began negotiations with Clipper 
Group, the Danish shipping firm which owned the CEC Future.13 He conversed 
initially with “Steven,” a hired middleman, before communicating directly with 
                                                                                                                           
en/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/Documents/PiracyReports/133-Annual2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G579-6ZEU]. 
 7 Ali, 718 F.3d at 932; Gulf of Aden, ENCYC. BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/
place/Gulf-of-Aden [https://perma.cc/9GC8-53GL] (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). Piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden threatens one of the most essential maritime passages in the world—the Suez Canal. Counter-
Piracy Operations, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_
48815.htm [https://perma.cc/MUM7-UGDP]. 
 8 Ali, 718 F.3d at 932. Between 2005 and 2013, Somali pirates made an estimated $400 million in 
ransoms paid for hijacked ships and crew. Faith Karimi, African Pirates Use Millions of Dollars in 
Ransom on Drugs, Real Estate, Prostitutes, CNN (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/02/
world/africa/horn-of-africa-piracy-loot/ [https://perma.cc/B3CC-JNNY]. 
 9 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933; see Escobedo, supra note 5. 
 10 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933; see also Rob Walker, Inside Story of Somali Pirate Attack, BBC NEWS 
(June 4, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8080098.stm [https://perma.cc/JAT5-7UF2]. 
 11 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. 
 12 Id. The government provided evidence that Ali boarded the CEC Future in territorial waters on 
November 9, that the ship then sailed through international waters—the high seas—on that day and 
possibly the next, and that the ship then stopped in Somali waters near Eyl where it remained until the 
deal was completed. United States v. Ali (Ali III), 885 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 2012). The gov-
ernment further admitted that Ali did not make a call to the Clipper Group until the ship had returned 
to territorial waters. Id. 
 13 See The Pirate Negotiator, NPR (May 1, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/01/403537252/
the-pirate-negotiator [https://perma.cc/MHR2-GSUH]. Ali’s ability to negotiate in English resulted 
from his travel to the United States on a student visa and his subsequent work in the United States 
after obtaining asylee status. United States v. Ali (Ali I), 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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Clipper Group CEO Per Gullestrup.14 Negotiations continued until January 
2009, when Ali and the owners of the CEC Future agreed to a $1.7 million ran-
som.15 The ransom was paid in full on January 14, 2009, delivered by parachute 
drop onto the deck of the ship in an orange, watertight container.16 For his ser-
vices, Ali received one percent of the total ransom less expenses, amounting to 
$16,500.17 Additionally, he received $75,000 via wire transfer into a personal 
bank account—a supplementary demand he made during the negotiations.18 Ali 
and the pirates released the crew of the CEC Future and disembarked the ship on 
January 16, 2009.19 
C. Ali’s Prosecution 
In June 2010, more than a year after the seizure, Ali was appointed Director 
General of the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Somaliland, a self-
declared independent state within Somalia.20 During this time, federal prosecu-
tors had begun to build a case against Ali, and in March 2011, invited him to 
attend a fictitious conference on education in Raleigh, North Carolina.21 Ali en-
tered the United States on April 20, 2011 with the intention of attending the 




Following his arrest, Ali faced a four-count grand jury indictment on incho-
ate offenses related to his actions aboard the CEC Future.24 Ali allegedly violat-
ed 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1651 by conspiring to commit piracy under the law of 
nations.25 Under count two, Ali was charged with aiding and abetting piracy un-
                                                                                                                           
 14 The Pirate Negotiator, supra note 13. 
 15 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. 
 16 Walker, supra note 10. 
 17 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Ali I, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
 20 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 933, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 25 Id. at 933; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1651 (2012). Section 371 provides, in pertinent part, that 
it is a crime when “two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United 
States.” § 371. 
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der 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1651.26 Counts three and four regarded conspiracy to 
commit hostage taking and aiding and abetting hostage taking in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1203.27 
Ali filed a motion to dismiss all four charges as legally defective.28 The 
District Court in United States v. Ali (Ali II) dismissed the first count of conspir-
acy to commit piracy, finding that the definition of piracy under international 
law did not contain a provision for conspiratorial liability and that the federal 
conspiracy statute could not be construed to apply in the international context.29 
The court limited count two of aiding and abetting piracy to only those acts 
committed on the high seas, based on its conclusion that the piracy statute did 
not apply in territorial waters.30 The District Court then upheld counts three and 
four, stating that due process did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over 
those counts because Ali was subject to universal jurisdiction for piratical acts 
committed on the high seas.31 
The District Court later dismissed counts three and four in United States 
v. Ali (Ali III), upon the discovery that the government had no evidence Ali had 
acted upon the high seas because his actions took place almost entirely within 
territorial waters, save a matter of minutes.32 Without proof that Ali had in-
voked universal jurisdiction by committing an act on the high seas, he had no 
expectation of being haled into court, and due process precluded the exercise 
of jurisdiction over those counts.33 The government in Ali sought to challenge 
the District Court’s dismissal of counts one, three, and four, and the limitation 
of count two.34 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Ali, 718 F.3d at 933; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1651. Section 1651 states, “Whoever, on the high 
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or 
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.” § 1651 (emphasis added). 
 27 Ali, 718 F.3d at 934; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1203. Section 1203 provides that criminal penal-
ties shall be sought against “whoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains 
and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third person 
or a governmental organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition 
for the release of the person detained, or attempts or conspires to do so . . . .” § 1203(a). 
 28 Ali, 718 F.3d at 934. 
 29 Id.; United States v. Ali (Ali II), 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 34 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 30 Ali II, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
 31 Id. at 44–45. Universal jurisdiction is based solely on the nature of the crime committed and 
can therefore be exerted by a country without any direct connection to the offense. See PRINCETON 
PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
23–24 (2001), https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUP9-RZTD] 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2016). It is used in most instances to prosecute acts, such as genocide, that are 
recognized as serious crimes under international law. See id. 
 32 885 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58, 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 33 Id. at 59–60. 
 34 Ali, 718 F.3d at 934. 
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B. Extraterritoriality and Charming Betsy 
Because Ali was arrested and charged in the United States, the court’s deci-
sion-making in United States v. Ali turned on its interpretation of federal criminal 
law.35 The court relied on two common judicial presumptions to reach its deci-
sion: first, the presumption against the extraterritorial effect of statutes, which 
was utilized to determine the application of the relevant federal criminal statutes 
to Ali’s actions.36 The strength of this presumption is such that the court cannot 
construe a statute containing ambiguous language to have an extraterritorial ef-
fect without additional support.37 
The second prong of the analysis required use of the Charming Betsy can-
on, which states that an act of Congress should never be construed to violate the 
law of nations if any other possible interpretation of the statute exists.38 Togeth-
er, these presumptions were employed by the court to ensure a proper and lim-
ited application of federal criminal law in the international context.39 They do 
not limit the actions of Congress, but rather limit the scope of interpretation 
available to the court.40 In the present case, the court used these presumptions to 
both dismiss count one and to uphold count two.41 
C. Aiding and Abetting Piracy Charges 
Aiding and abetting is an inchoate offense that allows a defendant to be 
charged for his acts during the commission of a crime.42 In response to the 
charge of aiding and abetting piracy, Ali argued that he should escape liability 
because section 1651 requires acts of piracy to be committed “on the high 
seas.”43 He claimed that it was not enough for the act of piracy itself to be com-
mitted on the high seas, but that the statute required his own acts of aiding and 
abetting to have occurred outside territorial waters.44 The District Court ulti-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See id. at 935. 
 36 Id. at 935–36. 
 37 See id. at 935. 
 38 Id.; see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 Cranch 64, 118 (1804). Charming Betsy in-
volved a cargo ship sold to a U.S. citizen and subsequently captured by a U.S. warship. Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. at 64–65. The U.S. government claimed the trading violated the non-intercourse law, 
which banned trade between the United States and France. Id. at 117. In determining whether the law 
had been violated, Chief Justice John Marshall famously stated that “an act of Congress ought never 
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .” Id. at 
118. 
 39 See Ali, 718 F.3d at 935–36. 
 40 Id. at 935. 
 41 See id. at 933, 936, 942. 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”); Ali, 718 F.3d at 
935. 
 43 18 U.S.C. § 1651; see Ali, 718 F.3d at 936. 
 44 Ali, 718 F.3d at 936. 
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mately agreed with this interpretation, limiting the charge to Ali’s acts commit-
ted during the few minutes the ship traversed outside of territorial waters while 
he was onboard.45 
In assessing the issue, the D.C. Circuit broke the analysis into two separate 
questions: first whether the Charming Betsy canon would prevent the prosecu-
tion of Ali for aiding and abetting piracy, and second, whether “the presumption 
against extraterritoriality [is] applicable to acts of aiding and abetting piracy not 
committed on the high seas.”46 As to the first question, the court determined 
what constitutes piracy under the law of nations by looking to the definition pro-
vided in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).47 Within its 
definition of piracy, UNCLOS states that piracy includes “any act of inciting or 
of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b),” such as 
voluntary operation or acts of violence committed by crew or passengers of a 
private ship.48 The court reasoned that this definition reflected the inclusion of 
aider and abettor liability in the international understanding of piracy.49 Further, 
the court stated that because this subparagraph did not contain explicit geograph-
ic limits in its language, particularly where those limits existed in other subpara-
graphs of the statute, the definition did not mean to confine aider and abettor 
liability to those acts committed on the high seas.50 Thus, the court found no 
Charming Betsy issue present in relation to count two.51 
In addition to Charming Betsy, Ali argued that the piracy statute was specif-
ically limited to the high seas and the government therefore sought to use the 
aiding and abetting statute to stretch the extraterritorial scope of the piracy stat-
ute to include acts committed in territorial waters.52 The court held that because 
section 1651 referenced not only the high seas, but also the definition of piracy 
as stated in the law of nations, it intended to incorporate the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the UNCLOS definition of piracy.53 Thus, the court found that alt-
hough the offense required someone to commit a piratical act while on the high 
seas, Ali could be liable for aiding and abetting that act without having been on 
the high seas himself.54 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Id. at 933; Ali II, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 32. 
 46 Ali, 718 F.3d at 936. 
 47 Id. 
 48 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
436 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Article 101(a) states that piracy includes “any illegal acts of violence or 
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship.” Subparagraph (b) states, “[Piracy consists of] any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.” Id. 
 49 Ali, 718 F.3d at 937. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 939–40. 
 53 Id. at 940–41. 
 54 Id. at 941. 
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D. Conspiracy to Commit Piracy Charges 
Using the same step-by-step analysis, the court reached the opposite con-
clusion for the charge of conspiracy to commit piracy.55 The court noted that 
where UNCLOS explicitly endorsed liability for aiding and abetting, it was si-
lent as to conspiratorial liability.56 Thus, the Charming Betsy doctrine cautions 
against allowing section 371 to supplant international law.57 Absent sufficient 
evidence that Congress intended to preempt international law, the court held that 
Charming Betsy required the dismissal of the conspiracy charge.58 
E. The Hostage-Taking Charges 
Counts three and four, conspiracy to commit hostage taking and aiding and 
abetting hostage taking, did not face the same challenges as counts one and two 
because section 1203—the statute governing hostage taking—unambiguously 
provides the extraterritorial scope of the crime and criminalizes Ali’s conduct.59 
Ali’s primary argument therefore reflects a constitutional challenge as to the im-
plications of due process on the extraterritorial application of a criminal statute.60 
The D.C. Circuit, deciding this question as a matter of first impression, 
turned to the reasoning of several other circuits and found that due process re-
quires “a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that 
such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”61 The court 
also turned to the well-established proposition that the court will only assert ju-
risdiction over a defendant who could have reasonably anticipated being haled 
into court.62 Ali argued that because Somalia was not a party to the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, he could not have anticipated the 
application of U.S. law to his actions.63 The court did not agree.64 It reasoned 
instead that the Convention provided global notice of the acts subject to prosecu-
tion and that according to precedent, fair warning did not require specific 
knowledge of U.S. law, but simply that the conduct in question would subject Ali 
to prosecution somewhere.65 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. at 941–42. 
 56 Id. at 942. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 942–43. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 943 (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 62 Id. at 944. 
 63 See id. at 945. 
 64 See id. 
 65 Id. 
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The court therefore affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of count one, re-
versed the narrowing of count two to include only those acts committed by Ali 
on the high seas, and reversed the dismissal of counts three and four.66 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Practical Impacts of Ali’s Prosecution 
In Ali, the court found that a hostage negotiator could be prosecuted for aid-
ing and abetting piracy, consistent with the law of nations, but could not be pros-
ecuted for conspiracy to commit piracy where there was no basis for conspirato-
rial liability in international law.67 Additionally, the court held that Ali’s prosecu-
tion for acts committed outside the United States did not violate due process.68 
In making these decisions, the court relied on basic tenets of international law—
namely the presumption against extraterritorial effect and the Charming Betsy 
canon—to make a proper determination as to the incorporation of domestic and 
international law.69 The reasoning applied by the court with regard to the extra-
territorial effect of federal criminal statutes was not only proper, but serves as 
invaluable modern precedent in an area of international jurisprudence not often 
litigated.70 
The charges in Ali added an additional layer of complication to the prosecu-
tion of piratical acts in U.S. courts because Ali was not charged with committing 
acts of piracy, but for two inchoate offenses relating to piracy.71 The court cor-
rectly used Charming Betsy to reason that section 1651 and the UNCLOS defini-
tion of piracy embrace the extraterritorial effect of aider and abettor liability but 
fail to endorse the federal conspiracy statute.72 The court’s decision extends lia-
bility to those who aid and abet piratical acts, thus appearing to enlarge the net of 
prosecution and provide another avenue through which the United States can act 
to deter Somali piracy.73 
Though the decision did extend liability to those who aid or abet, it did not 
extend liability for conspiracy.74 Taken together, the two prongs of this decision 
serve as proof that the court did not use its logic merely to broaden the ability of 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 947. 
 67 United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 942, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 68 Id. at 944. 
 69 See id. at 935–36. 
 70 See id. at 941; Jessica Piquet, Note, Changing Tides: An Adaptable Prosecution Approach to 
Piracy’s Shifting Problem, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 238, 242 (2013) (analyzing the three most 
common prosecution models used in combatting Somali piracy). 
 71 Ali, 718 F.3d at 935. 
 72 See id. at 942. 
 73 See id. at 940, 945. 
 74 Id. at 942. 
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the U.S. government to prosecute piratical acts.75 To the contrary, the court’s 
decision prevents any extension of the extraterritorial application of federal laws 
beyond what is provided in international law.76 Thus, the decision allows for the 
creation of liability for acts that aid or abet piracy as a form of liability separate 
and distinct from piracy itself, without straying from the international definition 
and understanding of piratical acts.77 
B. The Future of Pirates in U.S. Courts 
The D.C. Circuit’s rejection of Ali’s claims of due process protection shines 
an important spotlight on the recent efforts of the United States to prosecute pi-
racy and reverse the dramatic escalation of piratical activity seen in the Middle 
East in recent years.78 The court’s rejection of Ali’s argument that he could not 
be charged in the United States—because of the general due process protection 
against prosecution for a crime for which the defendant could not anticipate be-
ing haled into court—set an important precedent in an age where many modern 
states are reluctant to prosecute piracy cases because of potential questions re-
garding the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction.79 
Though this decision opened up the metaphorical floodgates for the U.S.  
government to put pirates on trial, the multilateral approach taken by the State 
Department in recent years leaves the future importance of this determination 
uncertain.80 The U.S. government has recently renewed efforts to combat piracy 
using a multilateral approach including diplomatic engagement, military power, 
collaboration with the private sector, targeting networks, and development and 
governance.81 As part of this approach, the United States has pushed to deter 
piracy by enhancing the capacity of Somalia, as well as other states in the region, 
to prosecute suspected pirates in their own legal systems.82 Ultimately, though 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. at 941. 
 78 See Reisman & Tennis, supra note 1, at 14, 18. 
 79 See Ali, 718 F.3d at 944; Sandra L. Hodgkinson, The Governing International Law on Mari-
time Piracy, in PROSECUTING MARITIME PIRACY: DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES 13, 16 (Michael P. Scharf et al. eds., 2015). 
 80 Ali, 718 F.3d at 940, 945; Thomas Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Remarks at Combating Piracy Week: The U.S. Government’s Approach to Counter-
ing Somali Piracy (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm [https://perma.cc/
PU72-YQCX] (“[T]he most durable long-term solution to piracy, the strategic solution, is the re-
establishment of stability in Somalia. Once Somalia has a viable government capable of policing its 
own territory, piracy will fade away. We are encouraged that the end of Somalia’s eight-year political 
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the number of future prosecutions in U.S. courts will likely be small, the prece-
dent created by the D.C. Circuit can be easily applied in future disputes.83 
C. Piracy as a Crime of Universal Jurisdiction 
For years, courts have grappled with cases involving the prosecution of pi-
rates, making determinations as to “who qualifies as a pirate, what acts constitute 
piracy under the law of nations, whether ancillary offenses can be prosecuted, 
and whether the piratical acts have occurred on the high seas.”84 The court’s de-
cision in Ali provides clear responses to those questions and a road map for fu-
ture courts in all jurisdictions to use in making similar determinations regarding 
the extraterritoriality of statutes used to prosecute piratical acts and related of-
fenses.85 
Piracy is perhaps the oldest and most widely acknowledged crime of uni-
versal jurisdiction.86 As such, international law permits states to define and pre-
scribe punishment for piracy as a crime of universal concern.87 Being the most 
widely recognized crime of universal jurisdiction, the jurisprudence surrounding 
international prosecution of piracy shapes the subsequent use of universal juris-
diction to prosecute offenses related to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.88 The development of the law of piracy has been and continues to be 
an integral part of the international legal system.89 In U.S. courts, unless and un-
til there are steps made to write international law into the U.S. Code, the court’s 
decision in Ali makes clear the necessity for cohesion between federal law and 
the law of nations and provides a foundation for future courts to make similar 
determinations.90 The ultimate goal of anti-piracy efforts in the United States and 
beyond is a re-stabilized Somalia that can police its own waters.91 If and when 
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that stability is established, it is likely that piracy in the Horn of Africa will simp-
ly fade away.92 
CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Ali, the court found that although the international def-
inition of piracy did embrace aider and abettor liability, it did not invoke the 
same or similar language in reference to conspiratorial liability. Additionally, 
the court held that Ali’s due process arguments could not hold water, and that 
he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the United States. The 
D.C. Circuit correctly focused its analysis of each issue on the interplay be-
tween domestic and international law, and the well-accepted notion that federal 
law should not be read to conflict with international law. Although the utility 
of the precedent in future U.S. court cases is unclear, the decision provides 
modern precedent—in waters not often traveled—as the international commu-
nity fights to end Somali piracy for good. 
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